Approved For Release 2001/08/28: CIA-RDP66R00638R000100160003-3

Attachment 1

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TS-185728

US OUTER SPACE POLICY IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The United States is moving into a dangerous period on the subject of outer space in the United Nations. Attacks on the United States space program will be made by the Soviet bloc and possibly other countries in the 17th United Nations General Assembly. A number of influential people at home and abroad still believe that they see an inconsistency between our expressed commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space and our use of outer space for military and defensive purposes. Because of the considerable potential for damage to our international position, we should seek some means for dissipating this misunderstanding and for responding effectively to expected criticism. This paper seeks to offer some practical proposals for appropriately clarifying and presenting US space policy in areas of vulnerability or ambiguity.

US space policy should be publicly enunciated in such a way as to: (1) maximize support for that policy in the international community and (2) encourage the international cooperation necessary for the effective prosecution of our national space program. For example, the US is interested in pursuing observation satellite programs with a minimum of international acrimony and obstruction. Optimum progress in the fields of space communications and space meteorology is also a product of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in a variety of matters. In short, a host of practical considerations compel us to frame our outer space policy in a way that maximizes the consent and cooperation of other states.

The challenge will probably focus on four principal points:
(1) alleged US military (weapons) ambitions in space; (2) reconnaissance satellite program; (3) space experiments which affect use of space by other countries; and (4) the US space communications program.

The best method of dealing with these matters will vary from forum to forum. So far as the challenges related to military programs are concerned, the United States should insist that: (1) questions of banning specific activities in outer space are appropriate to the disarmament forum, and (2) efforts outside of that forum to utilize such issues for diversionary purposes should not be tolerated. The most obvious weakness of this general tactic is this: our opponents are adept at constructing apparently plausible links between their criticism and the functional responsibilities of the particular international forum in which they have raised the issue. Because of this, and because perfunctory response can easily be misconstrued as evasion, it is advisable to develop brief substantive contingency statements for possible use in conjunction with the above general

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
response. In some cases, these substantive remarks on specific issues need involve no more than a reference to our record in the disarmament negotiations and to Soviet obduracy as having inhibited the satisfactory resolution of the general problem (e.g., a verified test ban agreement). In other cases, particularly that of photographic and observation satellites, a different approach seems advisable.

- 1. US Military Ambitions in Space. It may be asserted that the United States is seeking military domination in space and seeks to use space to launch weapons of mass destruction. If this subject is raised, the United States should, first, reiterate its commitment to the objective of preventing the use of outer space for military purposes. To that end, it should be added, the United States has incorporated as a major part of its treaty for general and complete disarmament a provision to ensure that nations shall not harbor weapons of mass destruction in outer space. The fact that this proposal is included in our disarmement plan does not appear to be adequately recognized; it should be exploited further. As instruments of public clarification, the United States should (a) reaffirm that the United States has no program to place weapons of mass destruction in outer space, and hopes that progress in disarmament will make it possible--before it is too late--to prevent the arms race from being extended to outer space; and (b), as appropriate in terms of negotiatory tactics, indicate our readiness to conclude an international agreement.
- 2. United States Reconnaissance Satellite Program. The United States has not hidden the fact that it is engaged in a program to develop photographic and observation satellites. We should not reinforce Soviet efforts to create an immoral and illegal image of satellite reconnaissance by denying the existence of our program or responding to Soviet allegations in a negative manner. On the contrary, we should continue to articulate our reasoned defense of the legitimacy of observation from outer space along the approved lines:
 - a. Observation of the earth from satellites makes possible the accomplishment of many tasks beneficial to mankind, such as weather forecasting, research surveys, mapping and geodesy. Many such activities have military applications, but this does not mean that they are non-peaceful or illegal.
 - b. Specifically, international law imposes no restrictions upon observation from outside the territorial limits of States. In this regard, observation of national territories from outer space—whether by visual, electronic,

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photographic or other means—does not differ from observation from the high seas or points outside national air space which is sanctioned by international law.

c. Under present circumstances, in which the United States has thus far been unable to secure adequate international agreement to a viable program of general and complete disarmament, the development of photographic and observation satellites also reduces the risk of miscalculation inherent in dealings with a closed society. The development of such satellites may also bring disarmament a step closer by providing support for verification of disarmament agreements.



- 3. United States Experiments in Outer Space. Widespread criticism has been voiced not merely by the Soviet bloc, but by leading citizens of the West about United States high altitude nuclear testing and other activities such as Project West Ford which are alleged to have harmful effects on manned space flights, artificial satellites, radio communications, scientific experiments, and on the earth's environment generally. These activities are viewed by some as inconsistent with the United Nations doctrine (adopted at our initiative) that outer space should be free for use by all in accordance with international law and not subject to national appropriation. An elementary principle of law is that no person or nation should use his freedom so as to interfere unreasonably with the freedom of others. The United States should welcome international consultation without permitting any veto over unilateral space activities which are required by our national security interests. We should indicate our willingness to make scientific explanation of allegedly harmful space programs in the newly constituted Consultative Group of the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), and should note that we, unlike USSR have notified in advance of scientific experiments.
- 4. United States Space Communications Program. At the Geneva meeting of the Outer Space Committee's Legal Subcommittee, and at the recent New York meeting of the full Committee the Soviet Union submitted a draft "Declaration of Basic Principles Governing the Activities of States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space." Among the objectionable provisions of that draft is the statement: "All activities of any kind pertaining to the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out solely and exclusively by States." The acrimonious debate over our domestic communications satellite legislation (e.g., charges of

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a "giveaway" of global space communications to the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and of inconsistency between our legislation and the United Nations Resolution--1721 (XVI)--on the peaceful uses of outer space) offers material for Soviet exploitation in the United Nations. We should seek to blunt the Soviet attack and to dispel foreign apprehension by stressing in greater detail than heretofore United States plans to work for a truly international arrangement in the interests of all UN members. The following points might be usefully made:

- a. reaffirm United States advocacy of a global and nondiscriminatory system of satellite communications with international participation.
- b. emphasize on the one hand the need to avoid competing international systems, with their economic and other disadvantages, and on the other hand stress the need for full international cooperation to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.
- c. recognize that there are a number of specific matters which by their very nature must be subject to multi-lateral, regional, or bilateral determination; for example: the general design of the international system, technical standards, the allocation of frequencies, allocation of the system as between different users and uses, rate-making, the location of ground stations, the source of funds for the establishment of ground stations in underdeveloped areas, financing and administration of technical assistance to ensure the effective operation of ground stations and domestic communications networks in less developed countries.
- d. remind other states that an initial concrete test of the willingness of nations to cooperate for their mutual benefit will arise at the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference to be sponsored by the ITU in October 1963. Appropriate international frequency allocation is a key element in the effective use of a satellite communications system.
- e. note that the Secretary-General of the ITU has invited all ITU members to submit information on (1) technical progress and developments in

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space telecommunications; (2) subjects which they regard as appropriate for international cooperation; and (3) which of these subjects, if any, should be included on the agenda of the 1963 EARC. The United States, as well as other members of the ITU, is giving close study to these questions. The Secretary-General of ITU is to prepare a report on the basis of responses to serve as guidance for ITU members.

- f. suggest, in necessarily broad and qualified terms, the potential utility of satellite communications to the United Nations (e.g., meteorology, educational programs), and our determination to see that opportunities in this regard are thoroughly explored.
- g. clarify the nature of its prospective national communications satellite corporation, including the supervisory and regulatory roles of the President, the Department of State and the Federal Communications Commission.
- h. finally, we should note that the private operation of US communications satellites is purely a domestic concern of the United States; necessary international arrangements would be based on intergovernmental agreements.